The Marketization of Electricity Price Needs to Break through the System Barrier

Recently, the National Development and Reform Commission approved the transmission and distribution tariffs for Yunnan's direct-purchased electricity pilots, which means that from the perspective of policy makers, direct purchase of electricity is still a feasible way to explore the reform of the power system at this stage.

Analysts believe that the reform of the power system can not only stay in the direct purchase of electricity pilot, do not fundamentally change the positioning of the current power grid, do not consider bidding and transmission and distribution separately, and simply through the direct purchase of electricity pilot, it is difficult to achieve electricity The expected effect of institutional reforms.

In 2002, the “Power System Reform Plan” (No. 5) issued by the State Council proposed that direct-purchased electricity pilots be carried out. Since 2005, the direct-purchased electricity pilots have been successively launched in Guangdong and other places, and have now expanded to several provinces. Direct purchase of electricity can increase the user's right to choose, and it is of great significance to break through the purchase and sales of power grids and achieve competitive bidding for access to the Internet. For example, if the electricity price reform is the nose of the power system reform, then the direct purchase of electricity can be compared to the copper ring on the nose of cattle.

However, since its implementation, on the one hand due to the lack of transmission and distribution price standards, on the other hand due to the impediment of the vested interests of the power grid, direct purchase of electricity trials are not satisfactory. The lack of standards for transmission and distribution tariffs has resulted in lack of operability in the implementation of pilot projects. Although the State Energy Administration of the People's Republic of China has clearly no longer approved the direct-purchased-electricity pilots last year, the transmission and distribution prices of the direct-purchased-electricity pilots still need to be examined and approved by the National Development and Reform Commission. At present, only Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Chongqing and other places have purchased power transmission and distribution directly and obtained approval from the Development and Reform Commission. Therefore, the approval of transmission and distribution tariffs for Yunnan's direct-purchased electricity pilots means that direct-purchased electricity has operability in Yunnan.

The contradiction of the power grid is due to the direct purchase of electricity that is actually re-slicing the cake between the power plants, the power grid and the power companies. The profit of the power grid comes from the sale of electricity. The larger the scope of pilot purchases, the more electricity is traded, and the lower the profit of the grid. Taking the electrolytic aluminum industry with the largest amount of electricity as an example, an electrolytic aluminum company in Yunnan has a monthly electricity bill of up to 4 billion yuan, and electricity costs account for 50% of operating costs. If the company pays 1 cent less electricity per kilowatt-hour, the company can save 800 million yuan in costs throughout the year. This 800 million "wool" is drawn from Yunnan Power Grid.

It is precisely this kind of shifting zero-sum game that direct-purchased electricity pilots are often overwhelmed by various grid mismatches during landing. On the one hand, the power grid is pursuing monopoly excess returns, and on the other hand, the power grid has its difficulties. For a long time, China has adopted the electricity price policy of industrial electricity subsidies for residential electricity. Direct electricity supply will reduce the income from electricity grid electricity industry, which indirectly increase the power grid to subsidize the burden of residential electricity. In addition, both the State Grid and China Southern Power Grid are central enterprises supervised by the SASAC, and there are pressures on performance and ranking.

How do we break through the barriers of vested interests and make direct purchase of electricity the “start” rather than “stop” of the power system reform? The author believes that this will require the implementation of the “Electricity Reform” No. 5 document in 2002 as soon as possible, and the reform of the power system as quickly as possible The quagmire that came to make minor repairs came out and was put into the top-level design of a system to advance drastically.

First of all, at the top-level design level, it is necessary to implement the reform of the No. 5 document as soon as possible to realize the multi-tiered reform pattern of “bidding Internet + distribution and distribution”. In order to achieve this goal, it is required that the reform of the electric power system must not stop at the pilot price of electricity but must go deep into the reform of the state-owned assets system.

Specifically, the SASAC should introduce specific measures for the reform of state-owned assets classification as soon as possible, specifying that the State Grid and the South China Grid should be classified as public welfare or guaranteed-type central enterprises, and no longer assess the performance of the power grid. This will make the power grid lose its motivation to maximize profit, and fundamentally reduce the over-net resistance of direct purchasing power. Based on this, we should implement “network separation” as soon as possible in the monopoly industry of the power grid, and implement the transmission and distribution business of the national grid and the southern grid, or the distribution business and the sale of electricity through split and reorganization or mixed ownership. Separation of business.

Secondly, at the specific operational level, the NDRC should verify the introduction of transmission and distribution tariffs with depletion rates in all provinces and regions as soon as possible according to the different circumstances of the provinces, so that the provinces are more maneuverable in the process of self-promotion of direct purchase pilots. The approved transmission and distribution tariffs should ensure the basic profits of the grid and ease the cost pressure of cross-subsidization. However, this alone can not be redefined as a primary profit platform.

Finally, the direct purchase power trading policy should be detailed as soon as possible, clarifying the detailed operating rules for direct purchase of electricity, transactions, settlement, procedures, disclosure, etc., in order to do a good job in the future of regional and national electric energy spot and futures trading from the law. From the policy to the actual operation and other aspects of preparation.